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ABSTRACT
Text mining and information retrieval techniques have been devel-
oped to assist us with analyzing, organizing and retrieving docu-
ments with the help of computers. In many cases, it is desirable
that the authors of such documents remain anonymous: Search
logs can reveal sensitive details about a user, critical articles or
messages about a company or government might have severe or
fatal consequences for a critic, and negative feedback in customer
surveys might negatively impact business relations if they are iden-
tified. Simply removing personally identifying information from a
document is, however, insufficient to protect the writer’s identity:
Given some reference texts of suspect authors, so-called authorship
attribution methods can reidentfy the author from the text itself.
One of the most prominent models to represent documents in
many common text mining and information retrieval tasks is the
vector space model where each document is represented as a vector,
typically containing its term frequencies or related quantities. We
therefore propose an automated text anonymization approach that
produces synthetic term frequency vectors for the input documents
that can be used in lieu of the original vectors. We evaluate our
method on an exemplary text classification task and demonstrate
that it only has a low impact on its accuracy. In contrast, we show
that our method strongly affects authorship attribution techniques
to the level that they become infeasible with amuch stronger decline
in accuracy. Other than previous authorship obfuscation methods,
our approach is the first that fulfills differential privacy and hence
comes with a provable plausible deniability guarantee.
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1 INTRODUCTION
For centuries, text has been used to convey information between
human beings through books, letters, newspapers and magazines.
With the advent of the digital age, more and more textual data is
being processed and analyzed by machines. Typical tasks include
text classification, which is used in particular for spam filtering [36]
and automated email routing [6], document retrieval [38], where
indexed documents are retrieved and ranked according to search
queries, sentiment analysis [23], and a wide variety of other tasks
in the information retrieval (IR) and text mining domains.
∗This report is an extended version of our paper of the same name, to appear in the
proceedings of SIGIR ’18: The 41st International ACM SIGIR Conference on Research &
Development in Information Retrieval.
In many cases, it is desirable for an author that his writings stay
anonymous. This could be the case if the textual data contains sen-
sitive information about the author, for instance in search queries.
Negative feedback from customer surveys might negatively impact
business relations if the author or his company is known, and criti-
cal news or blog articles about a company (or government) might
have severe (or fatal) consequences for the author of the article. In
other areas, anonymity is required for compliance or legal reasons,
e.g. in the selection of job candidates to eliminate discrimination.
Furthermore, without anonymity people and data owners might
feel reluctant to participate in surveys or to release their data. Of-
fering anonymity might be a means to convince them to share their
data in an anonymized form, which could then be used to perform
evaluations and as training data for machine learning models.
Traditional sanitization approaches for free text include remov-
ing parts containing personally identifiable information (PII) such
as the author’s name, or replacing it with a pseudonym. However,
these methods are insufficient to protect the author’s identity: As
the famous Netflix de-anonymization attack [31] and other stud-
ies [9, 16, 35, 42] have shown, the originator of data can be re-
identified from the data itself. We illustrate this in the case of the
AOL search data release [5], where search queries of over 650,000
users were released for research purposes in 2006. The search logs
were “anonymized” by linking the queries to a numerical identifier
instead of the actual user name. After some investigation in the
data, the New York Times eventually learned enough information
about user 4417749 so they could re-identify her as Thelma Arnold,
a 62-year-old widow from Lilburn, a city in Georgia.
The task of attributing authorship of an anonymous or disputed
document to its respective author is called authorship attribution.
Such methods usually make use of stylistic features to identify or
discriminate authors, as has been done with the statistic techniques
in [30] to resolve the dispute of the Federalist Papers. Recently, more
sophisticated methods have evolved that use statistical analysis and
machine learning to tackle the problem. A survey of modern author-
ship attribution methods is given by Stamatatos [40], and examples
include the JGAAP [18] and JStylo [26] frameworks. While these
powerful methods are useful in the literary world and in forensics,
they can often pose a threat to the privacy and integrity of authors
of documents with potentially sensitive content.
Contributions. Many IR and text mining algorithms rely on the
vector space model (VSM) [38] where documents are represented as
vectors containing, for instance, their term frequency (tf) or term
frequency–inverse document frequency (tf–idf) values. Therefore,
we propose a solution that targets this representation and produces
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synthetic tf vectors which can be used as a substitute for the original
ones. More precisely, we make the following contributions:
• In section 3, we propose “SynTF”, a differentially private
method to compute anonymized, synthetic term frequency
vectors for textual data that can be used as feature vectors for
common IR and text mining tasks such as text classification.
• In section 3.4, we give theoretical results on the differen-
tial privacy properties of our method. We derive improved
bounds for the privacy loss of ourmethod and give a heuristic
argument that differential privacy on large (discrete) output
spaces demands a large privacy loss if the result should fulfill
a minimum usefulness requirement.
• In section 4, we experimentally verify our method on a cor-
pus of newsgroups postings: A benign, well-intended analyst
wants to classify the documents into certain topics, whereas
a malicious attacker tries to re-identify the author of these
documents using authorship attribution techniques. The re-
sults show that our method has a much stronger impact on
the attacker’s than on the analyst’s task.
Based on our motivation and results, we presume that the synthetic
term frequency vectors (SynTF vectors) can be used in amultitude of
textmining and IR taskswhere the semantic similarity of documents
is decisive. On the other hand, our method obliterates stylistic
features that could otherwise reveal the identity and other privacy-
sensitive information about the writer such as age or gender.
2 PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we briefly describe text classification, and follow
with a more detailed introduction on differential privacy.
2.1 Text Classification
Text classification is the problem of assigning a given text to one or
more predefined categories. It has many applications, for instance
in the automated sorting and filtering of email messages, spam fil-
tering, categorization of news articles, etc. The problem is typically
solved using machine learning techniques. In the supervised model,
a classifier is trained based on a set of documents with known cat-
egories so it can recognize characteristic features in the text that
indicate the right category. A trained classifier can then predict the
most likely category for new texts whose category is unknown.
To obtain a representation corresponding to the vector space
and Bag-of-Words (BoW) models, documents are transformed into
feature vectors where each entry corresponds to a certain word
in an underlying vocabulary. The process of this transformation
is also called vectorization. Two common representations are term
frequency (tf) vectors where each entry equals the number of oc-
currences of the corresponding term in the document, and the term
frequency – inverse document frequency (tf–idf) vectors which are
derived from the tf vectors by also taking the number of documents
into account that contain the corresponding term. We refer to [39]
for more information on text mining and information retrieval.
2.2 Differential Privacy
Differential privacy has first been proposed by Dwork et al. [11]
under the name ϵ-indistinguishability. It works by releasing noisy
answers to the database queries, where the noisy results on two
databases that differ in only a single record are probabilistically
indistinguishable up to a multiplicative factor. We give some basic
terminology and results as required in the paper. For a broader
introduction and further details on differential privacy, we refer the
reader to the book by Dwork and Roth [12]. We follow the notation
of [8], with the one deviation that we describe random mechanisms
via random variables instead of probability measures on the output
space. Since every random variable induces a probability measure
on the underlying space, the two definitions are equivalent.
Definition 2.1 (Randomized mechanism). LetX andZ be two sets
whereZ is measurable, and let R(Z) be the set of random variables
on Z. A randomized mechanism from X to Z is a probabilistic
function M : X → R(Z) that assigns a random variable on Z
to each input x ∈ X. From an algorithmic point of view, we run
an instance of a randomized mechanismM on a given input x by
sampling a realization z of the random variable M(x). We write
this as z ←R M(x).
As noted above, each random variable onZ induces a probability
distribution onZ. A continuous/discrete distribution is typically
described by its probability density/mass function (pdf/pmf). By
slight abuse of notation, we write Pr[X = x] for the pdf/pmf of X .
Definition 2.2 (Adjacency). Given a metric dX on the spaceX, we
say that two inputs x1,x2 ∈ X are adjacent (with respect to dX) if
dX(x1,x2) ≤ 1. We write this as x1 ∼dX x2 (or x1 ∼ x2 if the metric
is unambiguous).
Definition 2.3 (Differential Privacy). Let ϵ > 0 be a privacy pa-
rameter. A randomized mechanism M : X → R(Z) fullfils ϵ-
differential privacy if for any two adjacent inputs x1,x2 ∈ X, and
any set of possible outputs Z ⊆ Im(M),
Pr[M(x1) ∈ Z ] ≤ eϵ · Pr[M(x2) ∈ Z ].
The privacy loss of a randomized mechanismM is the quantity
ℓ(M) := sup
x1∼x2
sup
Z ∈Im(M)
ln Pr[M(x1) ∈ Z ]Pr[M(x2) ∈ Z ] .
Note that ϵ is an upper bound for the privacy loss, and hence
any randomized mechanismM with finite privacy loss ℓ(M) also
fulfills ϵ-differential privacy with ϵ = ℓ(M).
Typically, the input space X models the set of databases over
some domain of valuesV with n records, i.e. X = Vn . In the case
of textual documents, we adopt the vector space/BoW model where
each document x is represented as feature vector over some vocabu-
laryV of size L. Since we anonymize each document independently,
we assume X = Z = RL≥0. We consider any two texts as adjacent
which is the most strict and conservative way to define adjacency.
The Exponential Mechanism. A very important and versatile
building block for differential privacy is the Exponential mech-
anism by McSherry and Talwar [27]. It applies to both numerical
and categorical data and fulfills ϵ-differential privacy as shown
in [27, theorem 6]. It requires a “measure of suitability” for each
possible pair of inputs and outputs:
Definition 2.4 (Rating function and sensitivity). A function ρ :
X × Z → R is called a rating function from X to Z. The value
ρ(x , z) is the rating for input x and output z. The sensitivity ∆ρ of
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the rating function ρ is its largest possible difference given two
adjacent inputs, over all possible output values:
∆ρ := max
z∈Z
max
x1∼x2
(
ρ(x1, z) − ρ(x2, z)
)
In our scenario with textual data, the rating function ρ will be
bounded to [0, 1], which implies that its sensitivity is ∆ρ ≤ 1.
Definition 2.5 (Exponential mechanism). Let ϵ > 0 be a privacy
parameter, and let ρ : X ×Z → R be a rating function. For each
x ∈ X, we define a random variable Eϵ,ρ (x) that is described by
the probability density function (pdf)
Pr
[Eϵ,ρ (x) = z] = exp ( ϵ2∆ ρ(x , z))∫
z′ exp
( ϵ
2∆ ρ(x , z′)
)
dz′
.
Note that a discrete version of the Exponential mechanism for
countableZ is obtained by replacing the integral with a sum.
3 SYNTHETIC TERM FREQUENCY VECTORS
In this section, we first describe the intended usage scenario. We
then take a closer look under the hood of authorship attribution
techniques and derive the basic motivation behind our SynTF
method. Finally, we describe our method in detail and present its
differential privacy properties.
3.1 Usage Scenario
Consider a data processor that wishes to share sensitive training
data formachine learningwith a third-party analyst. Feature vectors
are sufficient for most machine learning tasks since they are pro-
duced by the analyst in a preprocessing step anyway. Our method
automatically creates anonymized feature vectors that can be shared
with the analyst and which he can use in lieu of his own vectors.
In our present scenario, we are given a set of text documents
such as email messages, job applications or survey results. The
documents shall be analyzed by a (benign) third-party analyst, who
wants to perform a typical text mining task such as text classi-
fication. Our aim is to prevent authorship attribution attacks as
described above. Therefore, to protect the identity of the authors
and prevent re-identification, we only provide the analyst with
synthetic BoW feature vectors instead of the original documents.
Email providers and search engines could share anonymized feature
vectors of emails or (aggregted) search queries with advertising
networks to provide personalized ads while protecting their users.
Attacker Model. The attacker is presented with a document of
unknown authorship which has been written by one of several
suspected authors. Her goal is to identify the document’s actual
author from the group of suspects. We assume that she has a set of
similar reference documents from each suspect that she can use to
help decide which suspect to assign the unknown document to.
We compare the attacker’s capability to re-identify the authors
on the original plaintexts as well as the anonymized feature vectors.
We assume the attacker knows the dictionary, so she can convert
the numbers in the feature vectors to a textual representation by
repeating each word accordingly. This allows her to (partially)
deducemore complex features beyond BoW, such as theWritePrints
feature set which is often used in authorship attribution [1, 26].
As explained in the next section 3.2, most of these features cannot
be correctly inferred anymore, which is beneficial for our method
as these are precisely the stylistic features (beyond BoW) that are
exclusively exploited by our attacker.
3.2 Preventing Authorship Attribution
A popular feature set for authorship attribution has been described
in the WritePrints method [1]. It includes the following types of
stylistic features:
Lexical Counts of letters, digits, special characters, number of
characters and words, etc.
Syntactic Frequency of function words, punctuation, parts of
speech (POS) tags.
Structural Number and length of paragraphs and sentences,
URLs or quoted content, etc.
Content Frequencies of words (BoW model).
Idiosyncratic Misspelled words.
For some features such as letters, words, digits and POS tags, it
also considers their bi- and trigrams, thus taking order information
into account. These features have a strong capability to capture
individual stylistic characteristics expressed by the writer of a text.
For instance, one author might subconsciously prefer using the
passive voice or past tense, so many verbs will end in an “ed”-
bigram, whereas another author might tend to use the present
continuous or gerund which causes many “ing”-trigrams.
Ordinary text mining and IR tasks such as classification typically
only use content-level features which are often modeled and rep-
resented as term frequency vectors (tf vectors) in the BoW model.
Most of the stylistic features used for authorship attribution thus
get lost in vectorization: In fact, the tf vectors by their very nature do
not capture any structural information, and most syntactic features
will be destroyed as well. Apart from the content (and idiosyncratic)
features, however, we can still derive lexical features if the BoW
vocabulary is known.
Since the attacker can still exploit the derived lexical features, we
aim at disturbing them in a way that keeps the meaning or theme
of a document intact, thus further allowing the classification task
but impairing authorship attribution. Lexical features are mostly
related with the spelling, therefore, our idea is to replace words in
the input with words with similar meaning (synonyms) but different
spelling to make the lexical features meaningless for the attacker.
On the other hand, this will preserve the general theme of the text,
so we hope that the impact is little on the classification task.
3.3 The SynTF Mechanism
Our goal is a differentially private anonymization method to derive
synthetic feature vectors that keeps the theme of the represented
document intact and at the same time prevents authorship attribu-
tion attacks. For performance and memory efficiency reasons, we
require our method to preserve the sparseness in the tf vectors. Sim-
ply applying Laplace noise [11] or differentially private histogram
publication methods [46] will fail this requirement, since they pro-
duce dense vectors. Our core idea is to take a word count entry for
one term in the tf vector and probabilistically distribute it across all
terms in the pre-defined vocabulary. The probability of each term is
determined according to its similarity with the original word. Word
similarity can be expressed in various ways, cf. section 4.1.2.
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Differential privacy presents a strong requirement for themethod:
Namely, every possible output must occur with non-zero possibility
for any other input. This means that a statement on food preference
can be processed to the same output as a conversation on politics,
with non-zero probability. This has two implications: First, we must
ensure that the probability of picking a term is always greater than
zero, even for totally unrelated words. Second, it must be possible
that two input texts of different lengths produce the same number
of words in their resulting tf vectors. Therefore, we must also spec-
ify the output length. Note that this approach limits the number
of entries that are changed from the original to the anonymized tf
vector, so it keeps the sparseness of the resulting vector intact.
Algorithm Description. In the following, let V denote the under-
lying vocabulary of size |V | = L. The vocabulary could be derived,
for instance, from a reference corpus of documents from a simi-
lar context as the target documents which shall be anonymized.
We will describe the SynTF approach for a single document T , but
it is possible to anonymize an entire corpus simultaneously. The
anonymization for a document T consists of two main phases:
Analysis We vectorize the document T to its feature vector
t = (t1, . . . , tK ) ∈ RK≥0. Typically, twill be a tf or tf–idf vector
over the underlying vocabularyV . Next, we normalize twith
respect to the ℓ1-norm to transform it into a composition
vector θt := t/∥t∥1 whose entries can be interpreted as
probability distribution over V .
Synthesis We repeatedly sample terms v1, . . . ,vn from the
distribution θt on V . For each vi , we use the Exponential
mechanism to pick a substitute output term wi ∈ V with
probability proportional to a similarity rating ρ(vi ,wi ). Fi-
nally, we construct a synthetic tf vector s ∈ NL≥0 of length n
by counting all the termswi .
Algorithm 1 illustrates the synthesis phase of our SynTF mecha-
nism in pseudocode. It uses the following definition:
Definition 3.1 (Categorical distribution). For an enumerable set
V = {v1, . . . ,vk } and associated probability vector p = (pv )v ∈V
with
∑
v ∈V pv = 1, the categorical distribution, denoted Cat(p), is
defined on V through Pr[Cat(p) = vi ] = pi .
Algorithm 1: SynTF Term-Frequency Vector Synthesis
Input: document vector θt, desired output length n, privacy
parameter ϵ > 0, rating function ρ : V ×V → [0, 1]
Result: synthetic tf vector s ∈ N |V | with |s| = n
1 for i ← 1 to n do // produce output term-by-term
2 vi ←R Cat(θt); // sample word vi
3 wi ←R Eϵ,ρ (vi ); // choose synonym for vi
4 end
5 s ← (|{i ∈ [1,n] : wi = w}|)w ∈V ; // count synonyms
3.4 Differential Privacy Results
In this section, we will prove that our SynTF mechanism fulfills
differential privacy (definition 2.3), which amounts to deriving an
upper bound ϵ on its privacy loss.
We keep the previous notation whereV is the vocabulary of size
L, t = (t1, . . . , tK ) is the tf or tf–idf vector of the target document
to be anonymized, and θt := t/∥t∥1 is the corresponding vector of
probabilities. For each pair of words v,w ∈ V , we have a similarity
score ρ(v,w) ∈ [0, 1]. This score will be used in the Exponential
mechanism, which outputsw on input v with probability
πv,w := Pr[Eϵ,ρ (v) = w] =
exp
( ϵ
2∆ ρ(v,w)
)∑
w ′ exp
( ϵ
2∆ ρ(v,w ′)
) .
Note that we assume that all potential inputs are adjacent which is
a very conservative interpretation of differential privacy. This is
used in the following lemma, which presents a (niched) counterpart
to the known postprocessing lemma [12, proposition 2.1], to show
that a convex combination of an ϵ-differentially private algorithm
is again ϵ-differentially private.
Lemma 3.2 (Randomized Preprocessing). Given two indepen-
dent randomized mechanisms A : X → R(Y) and B : Y → R(Z),
we define their functional composition B ◦ A : X → R(Z) as first
sampling from A and using the resulting sample as input for B. The
composition B ◦ A is ϵ-differentially private provided that B is ϵ-
differentially private where all inputs y,y′ ∈ Y to B are considered
adjacent (that is, dY (y,y′) ≤ 1).
Proof. Define αx,y := Pr[A(x) = y] and βy,z := Pr[B(y) = z]
for all x ∈ X,y ∈ Y, z ∈ Z. Then
Pr[(B ◦ A)(x) = z] = Pr©­«
⊔
y∈Y
[A(x) = y] ∧ [B(y) = z]ª®¬
=
∑
y∈Y
Pr[A(x) = y] · Pr[B(y) = z]
=
∑
y∈Y
αx,y · βy,z .
The first equality stems from enumerating, over y ∈ Y, all possible
ways to get output z on input x . The second equality is due to the
fact that these possibilities are disjoint, and uses the independence
between the two randomized mechanisms.
Fix any adjacent x1,x2 ∈ X and z ∈ Z and define the quantities
βˆz := maxy∈Y βy,z and βˇz := miny∈Y βy,z . Now
Pr[(B ◦ A)(x1) = z]
Pr[(B ◦ A)(x2) = z] =
∑
y αx1,yβy,z∑
y αx2,yβy,z
≤
∑
y αx1,y βˆz∑
y αx2,y βˇz
=
βˆz
βˇz
≤ eϵ ,
since the sums are convex combinations of βy,z and since both
values of y ∈ Y that maximize/minimize βy,z are adjacent. □
We now show that algorithm 1 is differentially private:
Theorem 3.3 (Differential Privacy of SynTF). Given a pri-
vacy parameter ϵ > 0 and an output length n ∈ N, our SynTF
mechanism (algorithm 1) fulfills ϵn-differential privacy. □
Proof. Each iteration (the body of the for-loop) consists of two
steps: First, our algorithm samples one word v according to the
probabilities in θt, which can be thought of running a random-
ized mechanism A with the underlying categorical distribution.
Second, it substitutes v with another word w ∈ V according to
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their similarity using the Exponential mechanism Eϵ,ρ , which pro-
vides ϵ-differential privacy. By the preceding lemma 3.2, both steps
combined are ϵ-differentially private. Since we iterate n times, the
sequential composition theorem [12, theorem 3.16] yields ϵn-differ-
ential privacy for the entire for-loop. Aggregating the synonym
counts is a simple postprocessing step which keeps the privacy
loss unchanged [12, proposition 2.1], and we hence achieve ϵn-
differential privacy for algorithm 1. □
3.4.1 Alternative Bound for the Exponential Mechanism. We can
derive an alternative bound for the privacy loss of the Exponential
mechanism by also considering the maximum change across all
outputs for fixed inputs (in contrast to the sensitivity which tracks
the maximum change across adjacent inputs for fixed outputs):
Theorem 3.4 (Alternative bound). Let ϵ > 0 be a privacy
parameter and ρ : X ×Z → R be a rating function with sensitivity
∆ where |Z| = L. Let
∆¯ := max
x ∈X
max
z,z′∈Z
|ρ(x , z) − ρ(x , z′)|.
Then the privacy loss ℓ(Eϵ,ρ ) is bounded by (ϵ¯ + lnη), where
ϵ¯ := ϵ ∆¯
∆
and η = η(ϵ¯,L) = e
−ϵ¯/2 + L − 1
e ϵ¯/2 + L − 1 < 1. □
Proof. For any x ∈ X and z ∈ Z, denote by
πx,z := Pr[Eϵ,ρ (x) = z] =
exp
( ϵ
2∆ ρ(x , z)
)∑
z′ exp
( ϵ
2∆ ρ(x , z′)
)
the probabilities that Eϵ,ρ outputs z on input x . Then for adjacent
x1,x2 ∈ X and any fixed z ∈ Z, we bound
πx1,z
πx2,z
=
exp
( ϵ
2∆ ρ(x1, z)
)∑
z′ exp
( ϵ
2∆ ρ(x1, z′)
) · ( exp ( ϵ2∆ ρ(x2, z))∑
z′ exp
( ϵ
2∆ ρ(x2, z′)
) )−1
=
∑
z′ exp
( ϵ
2∆ [ρ(x2, z′) − ρ(x2, z)]
)∑
z′ exp
( ϵ
2∆ [ρ(x1, z′) − ρ(x1, z)]
)
≤ 1 +
∑
z′,z exp
( ϵ
2∆ [
≤∆¯
ρ(x2, z′) − ρ(x2, z)]
)
1 +
∑
z′,z exp
( ϵ
2∆ [ρ(x1, z′) − ρ(x1, z)
≥−∆¯
])
≤ 1 + (L − 1) exp
( ϵ¯
2
)
1 + (L − 1) exp(− ϵ¯2 ) = e ϵ¯ · e−ϵ¯/2 + L − 1e ϵ¯/2 + L − 1
=:η<1
.
The result follows by taking logarithms and observing that the
numerator for η is strictly smaller than its denominator. □
Note that in general cases we normally have ∆¯ > ∆ since the
sensitivity ∆ is restricted to adjacent inputs. The growth due to
the factor ∆¯/∆ in ϵ¯ = ϵ∆¯/∆ would therefore typically exceed the
savings due to lnη < 0, so the alternate bound ϵ¯ + lnη would be
worse than the original bound ϵ as derived in the standard differen-
tial privacy proof for the Exponential mechanism [27]. However,
if we consider all inputs as adjacent, and if ρ is symmetric in its
arguments, then we will have ∆¯ = ∆ and ϵ¯ = ϵ , and thus the factor
η < 1 will provide a real improvement over the original bound. This
is the case in our algorithm:
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Figure 1: Standard and alternative upper bound ϵ + lnη for
the privacy loss ℓ(Eϵ,ρ ) given different output space sizes L.
Corollary 3.5 (Improved differential privacy bound). Given
a privacy parameter ϵ > 0 and an output length n ∈ N, our SynTF
mechanism fulfills ((ϵ + lnη(ϵ,L)) · n)-differential privacy. □
Proof. The proof is identical to that of theorem 3.3 with the im-
provement that the Exponential mechanism provides (ϵ+ lnη(ϵ,L))-
differential privacy. □
We illustrate the effects of the factor η(ϵ,L) in figure 1: The
original upper bound ϵ is the black dotted line on top, the other lines
show the improved upper bound ϵ + lnη for different values of L ∈
{2, 100, 30000}. 30000 is approximately the size of the vocabulary
in some of our experiments, The effect of the improved bound
increases with the privacy parameter ϵ , whereas large output spaces
have a smoothing effect that dampens the improvement.
3.4.2 Tight Worst-Case Bounds. A major factor in the differen-
tial privacy proof of theorem 3.4 and corollary 3.5 consists of bound-
ing the privacy loss ℓ(Eϵ,ρ ) for the Exponential mechanism used
in algorithm 1. This privacy loss is defined as smallest upper bound
for the fractions πv1,w /πv2,w , where πv,w ∝ exp
( ϵ
2∆ ρ(v,w)
)
are
the the associated probabilities. The probabilities πv,w depend on
the underlying vocabularyV , the rating function ρ, and the privacy
parameter ϵ , but do not take the documents t and t′ into account.
Therefore, we can compute the privacy loss
ℓ(Eϵ,ρ ) = max
w ∈V
maxv ∈V πv,w
minv ∈V πv,w
(1)
in advance and independently from any documents to be anon-
ymized once the parameters V , ρ, and ϵ have been determined.
Our SynTF method with privacy parameter ϵ and output length
n thus in fact fulfills ℓn- instead of ϵn-differential privacy where
ℓ = ℓ(Eϵ,ρ ) is the privacy loss of the Exponential mechanism. This
turns out to lead to huge gains in practice, reducing the privacy
loss upper bound by almost 50% in our experiments (cf. section 4.2).
To see that these bounds are tight, note that we can craft two
input documents t1 and t2 that each consist of only a single word
v1 and v2, respectively, where v1 and v2 are precisely those that
maximize the fraction πv1,wπv2,w in eq. (1) for the optimalw ∈ V .
3.4.3 Relationship between Utility and Privacy Loss. We present
the following theoretical results for the Exponential mechanism
which suggest that in order to get “useful” outputs with a large
output space, we need to choose a large privacy parameter ϵ in the
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order of ln|Z|, under the assumption that there are only few good
outputs for each input.
Theorem 3.6 (Upper and Lower Bounds for Utility). Let
ρ : X ×Z → R be a rating function with sensitivity ∆, and |Z| ∈ N,
Take any fixed x ∈ X and denote by ρˆx and ρˇx the maximum and
minimum rating scores of any output for x , respectively. For a desired
minimum rating τ ∈ [ρˇx , ρˆx ], splitZ into T := {z ∈ Z : ρ(x , z) ≥
τ } and T := Z \ T . Then the probability Pr[Eϵ,ρ (x) ∈ T ] that the
Exponential mechanism yields an element with score at least τ has
lower and upper bounds
|T |
|T | + |T | exp(− ϵc2∆ ) ≤ Pr[Eϵ,ρ (x) ∈ T ] ≤ |T ||T | + |T | exp(− ϵ ∆¯2∆ ) ,
where c := τ − maxz∈T ρ(x , z) is the difference between τ and the
next lower rating score, and ∆¯ := ρˆx − ρˇx .
Proof. For the lower bound, consider the inverse probability
Pr
[Eϵ,ρ (x) ∈ T ]−1 = ∑z∈Z exp ( ϵ2∆ ρ(x , z))∑
z∈T exp
( ϵ
2∆ ρ(x , z)
)
= 1 +
∑
z∈T exp
( ϵ
2∆ ρ(x , z)
)∑
z∈T exp
( ϵ
2∆ ρ(x , z)
)
≤ 1 + |T | exp
( ϵ
2∆ (τ − c)
)
|T | exp( ϵ2∆τ )
≤ 1 + |T ||T | exp
(
− ϵc2∆
)
.
The upper bound is derived similarly. □
Solving for ϵ , these bounds lead to the following corollary:
Corollary 3.7 (Necessary and Sufficient Conditions on ϵ).
Given a probability p ∈ [0, 1], and with the notation from theorem 3.6,
we have the following necessary and sufficient conditions on ϵ for
Pr[Eϵ,ρ (x) ∈ T ] ≥ p:
ϵ ≥

2∆
∆¯
ln
(
p
1−p · |T ||T |
)
(necessary condition)
2∆
c ln
(
p
1−p · |T ||T |
)
(sufficient condition)
□
Note that for our SynTF algorithm, we have ∆¯ = ρˆx − ρˇx ≤ ∆.
Hence for p = 1/2, the necessary condition becomes
ϵ ≥ 2 ln
(
p
1 − p ·
|T |
|T |
)
= 2 ln
( |T |
|T |
)
= 2 ln
( |Z| − |T |
|T |
)
.
Given a reasonable choice of τ , the number |T | of “useful” outputs
whose score is at least τ will be small. In the case of our SynTF
mechanism, we can think of τ as a threshold for the rating function
that distinguishes good alternatives for a given word from poor
ones, and |T | would reflect the number of suitable substitutes (syn-
onyms). If we assume |T | to be bounded by some constant, then
ϵ ∈ Ω(ln|Z|), that is, ϵ needs to grow logarithmically in the size of
the output space |Z| in order to allow meaningful results.
4 EVALUATION
In this section, we first describe our implementation of the SynTF
mechanism along with associated parameters and our implementa-
tion choices. We then describe our experiment setup and report the
evaluation results. Finally, we compare SynTF with a traditional
information removal approach in the same experiment setup.
4.1 Algorithm Implementation and Parameters
We implemented a prototype of our SynTF algorithm in Python
using the SpaCy package (http://spacy.io/) for text parsing function-
ality as well as the numpy and SciPy packages [17, 45] for (vector)
computations. Besides the explicit parameters mentioned in algo-
rithm 1, there are various implementation-dependent parameters
that influence SynTF in its different stages. We now describe these
parameters and corresponding implementation choices.
4.1.1 Vocabulary and Vectorization. We build a custom vector-
izer to extract the vocabulary from the training or a given reference
corpus, and to subsequently transform documents to their BoW
tf vectors. We can specify several special options: Firstly, we can
choose, for each extracted word, to keep its spelling as-is, to change
its morphology through lemmatization, or to convert it to lower
case. Secondly, we can instruct the vectorizer to include additional
terms that are similar or synonymous to the actually extracted
words, as to provide a greater choice of candidates for replacing a
word with a suitable synonym but hopefully with different spelling
to disturb lexical authorship attribution features. Our implementa-
tion uses the synonyms provided byWordNet’s synsets. We remove
stop words and numbers by default.
4.1.2 Similarity Rating Function. We now describe the rating
function ρ(v,w) that expresses the suitability of a substitute term
w for an input term v . One fundamental technique are word vectors
or embeddings which are dense vector representations of words
in a real vector space. They are commonly derived with the in-
tention that similar words have embeddings in the vector space
that are nearby. We can therefore compute the similarity between
two words simply and efficiently as cosine similarity between their
corresponding word vectors. Two recent models to derive word
vectors that achieve high accuracy in word similarity and analogy
benchmarks are “word2vec” [28, 29] and “GloVe” [34].
As we saw in section 3.2, features such as the frequency of
certain words and character n-grams often make an essential and
decisive contribution to authorship attribution methods. Suppose
we can choose a substitute for a given input term from a set of
candidates with comparable similarity rating. Then to best prevent
the attack, it is beneficial to pick the candidate that differs most in
spelling from the input in order to obscure our word and n-gram
frequencies. We can achieve this by including the (normalized)
Levenshtein or n-gram distance in the rating function for the terms.
Note that care must be taken to weight this appropriately – a too
strong preference for differently-spelled substitutes will often pick
completely different words that also have a different meaning from
the original word, thus also negatively affecting the utility.
We have implemented the word similarity rating function as
ρ(v,w) := cos(v,w) − sB(v,w),
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Table 1: Attack scenarios with minimum per author num-
bers for active groups and train/test messages in the dataset.
Scenario Suspects #Groups #Train #Test
Top 5/Any Top 5 ≥ 1 ≥ 35 ≥ 17
Top 10/Any Top 10 ≥ 1 ≥ 28 ≥ 9
Top 5/Multi Top 5 ≥ 2 ≥ 29 ≥ 9
Top 10/Multi Top 10 ≥ 2 ≥ 21 ≥ 8
where cos(v,w) is the cosine similarity between the corresponding
GloVe [34] word vectors, and B(v,w) ∈ [0, 1] is the bigram overlap,
i.e. the proportion ofmatching letter bigrams inv andw . The scaling
factor s determines if and how strong the bigram overlap affects
the rating. As optimization, we precompute the word similarity
ratings and probabilities for the Exponential mechanism for the
entire vocabulary, which yields a significant performance boost.
4.2 Experiment Description
In this section, we describe the context and setup of our evaluation.
Dataset. We perform a series of experiments with our algorithm
on the “20 newsgroups” dataset1. It comprises almost 19,000 post-
ings from 20 different newsgroups, and comes with predefined train
(60%) and test (40%) sets which we use throughout our experiments.
For the text classification task, a label is provided for each mes-
sage indicating the corresponding newsgroup. For the authorship
attribution task, we extracted the “From“ field in the header of
each message and use it as author identifier. Note that we strip
header and footer data before performing the actual classification
and identification tasks as to make them more realistic.
Attack Scenarios. After filtering out missing and ambiguous iden-
tifiers, we count 5735 authors, but the majority provides insufficient
training samples (below 20 for 5711 authors) for properly fitting
a model. We therefore evaluate the attack only for the “top” au-
thors with the largest number of messages in the dataset. Since
the number of candidate suspects from which the correct author
has to be determined also can influence the authorship attribution
performance, we evaluate the attack for the top 5 and top 10 authors.
Table 1 provides the number of train and test messages per author.
Another issue with the dataset is that some users are active in
only a single newsgroup, in which case knowledge of authorship
(attack) implies knowledge of the targeted newsgroup (utility). We
therefore devise two subsets of authors:
Any Each suspect author can have postings in any number
(one or more) of newsgroups.
Multi Each author must be active in at least two different news-
groups.
The idea of the “Multi” group is to reduce the similarity between the
attacker’s and analyst’s tasks to allow a clearer distinction when
evaluating the impact of our anonymization technique.
Processing Pipeline. All documents traverse a processing pipeline
that can be broken down into three parts: For each document, the
main SynTF pipeline (figure 2a) first produces a synthetic tf vector
1http://qwone.com/~jason/20Newsgroups/
Table 2: Evaluated and optimal SynTF parameters.
Parameter Values Description
morpho- lemma Lemmatize words.
logy lower Convert words to lower case.
orth Leave spelling unchanged.
synsets true/false Extend vocabulary with addi-
tional synonyms from WordNet.
s 0, 0.1, 0.2, Impact factor of letter bigram
0.3, 0.4 overlap on rating function ρ.
n 100, 150, 200 Length of output vector (words).
ϵ 35–55 (47.5), Privacy parameter (stepsize 2.5).
effectively 25.4 Effective loss ℓ, cf. sec. 3.4.2.
(cf. section 3.3). It can be influenced by a number of parameters as
described in section 4.1. Next, the synthetic tf vectors traverse the
analyst’s text classification pipeline (figure 2b) and the attacker’s
authorship attribution pipeline (figure 2c) to measure the prediction
performance for each task. In both cases, we evaluate a multinomial
naïve Bayes classifier and a linear SVM. We perform 10 runs of the
entire pipeline (anonymization + evaluation) for each combination
of parameters to reduce fluctuations and get stable results.
The analyst (cf. figure 2b) first transforms the tf vectors to tf–
idf vectors which are commonly used in classification tasks. He
then trains a classifier with the training subset of the dataset, and
subsequently uses it to predict the newsgroups for the test subset.
We implement the classification in Python based on scikit-learn
[33], using its MultinomialNB classifier with smoothing (α = 0.01),
and its LinearSVC classifier with default parameters (C = 1).
For the attack, we make use of the “JStylo” authorship attribu-
tion framework [26]. It supports several extended feature sets such
as “WritePrints” proposed in [1]. WritePrints includes additional
stylistic features (cf. section 3.2) on top of the usual BoW that have
to be extracted from full texts. However, since the attacker only gets
synthetic tf vectors and not full texts, she first converts the numbers
in the tf vectors to text by repeating each word accordingly, which
allows at least partial deduction of WritePrints features (“reverse
vectorization” in figure 2c). Note that the “full” WritePrints feature
set contains a virtually endless number of features and severely
degrades performance (speed). Furthermore, the authors of [26]
have shown that despite its title, the “limited” version even out-
performs the “full” WritePrints in terms of accuracy, which we
could confirm in own experiments. Therefore, we keep the default
JStylo configuration with the “WritePrints (Limited)” feature set.
JStylo builds on the Weka machine learning library. We use its
NaiveBayesMultinomial classifier with Laplace smoothing and
its SMO SVM classifier with linear kernel and C = 1 by default.
Finding Optimal Parameters. We perform a grid search over the
SynTF parameters listed in table 2 to find “optimal” parameters in
the sense that they should simultaneously strongly affect author-
ship attribution but mostly leave classification into newsgroups
unaffected. As metric to find these optimal settings we use the dif-
ference between the relative performance impacts on utility and
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(a) The main SynTF processing pipeline, including parameters.
(b) Subsequent text classification pipeline.
(c) Subsequent authorship attribution pipeline.
Figure 2: Processing pipelines for the main SynTF mechanism and subsequent analyst and attacker tasks.
attack: Given parameters p, denote by βU (p) the relative perfor-
mance of the analyst’s classification task (measured as F1 score), and
similarly denote by βA(p) the relative performance of the attacker’s
task. Then the optimal parameters are pˆ = argmaxp(βU (p)−βA(p)).
Since we want them to equally cover all four attack scenarios, we
find optimal parameters that maximize the minimum difference
βU (p) − βA(p) over all attack scenarios. Furthermore, we perform
10 runs of the anonymization–evaluation process for each combi-
nation of parameters to reduce fluctuations and get stable results.
4.3 Discussion of Results
After running the evaluation, we found the optimal parameters
highlighted in table 2 with privacy parameter ϵ = 47.5. However,
our tight bounds analysis (cf. section 3.4.2) shows that the effective
privacy loss ℓ(Eϵ,ρ ) ≈ 25.4 is only about half as large. Table 3 pro-
vides exemplary performance figures in the “Top 10/Any” scenario
for both topic classification and authorship attribution. Figure 3
depicts the relative performance between utility (green lines, left
y-axis) and attack (red lines, right y-axis) in the different stages
of SynTF. The bottom x-axis indicates the privacy parameter ϵ ,
with the corresponding effective privacy loss values ℓ(Eϵ,ρ ) on
the top. The dotted, dashed, and solid lines mark the utility and
attack performances with the original (plaintext), vectorized, and
synthetic data, respectively, where we used the optimal parameters
for vectorization and synthesis as mentioned above.
We observe that the vectorization already affects the attack more
due to the loss of structural and syntactic features, except in one
case (Top 5/Multi). Note that the size of the (positive) gap between
the green and red lines indicate the analyst’s gain over the attacker
in terms of the relative performance of the corresponding stage of
the anonymization. Obviously both utility and attack suffer with
a decreasing privacy parameter ϵ . However, in most cases the gap
between analyst and attacker is even higher than after vectorization,
which indicates a growing advantage for the analyst. Furthermore,
it shows that our SynTFmechanism successfully impairs authorship
attribution while having only a mild effect on the classification task.
Impact of Attack Scenarios. Comparing the four scenarios with
respect to the gap size, we make the following deductions: As ex-
pected, authorship attribution quickly becomes harder with an
increasing number of suspect authors. Similarly, excluding authors
who are active in only one newsgroup widens the gap, as we can
see when going from the “Any” to the “Multi” scenarios. This indi-
cates that our method is even more effective when the benign and
malicious tasks are actually based on distinct problems.
Impact of Parameters from Table 2. A key factor in the success of
ourmethod is the letter bigram overlap B in the rating function ρ. Its
effect of preferring synonyms with different spelling improves the
capability of our method to prevent authorship attribution attacks.
We illustrate this effect depending on the bigram overlap factor s
in figure 4: Without bigram overlap (s = 0), the attacker has an
advantage in all “Top 5” scenarios (red bars). Only when s ≥ 0.3,
we see a shift of power in favor of the analyst (green bars). In the
“Top 10” scenarios, the analyst enjoys an advantage even without
the bigram overlap, but we can roughly double his advantage if we
choose the optimal value s = 0.3.
Regarding morphology, observe that the use of upper and lower
case letters is a stylistic feature that can pose a clue for authorship
attribution but barely has any relevance for topic inference. There-
fore, transforming all words to lowercase affects the attacker more
than the analyst. Lemmatization strips off word endings and hence
reduces the attacker’s information on writing style further, but it
also has an impact on classification since the meaning can change
between a word and its lemma. Still, in terms of our definition of
“optimal” parameters, using lemmatized words gave the best rela-
tive performance gain for the analyst, indicating that the lost word
endings are more severe for the attack.
Other parameters are less insightful: Increasing the output length
will help increase both tasks’ performance, however, the gain be-
comes less for larger output lengths. Moreover, the inclusion of
additional synonyms in the vocabulary did not provide any benefit.
SVM Anomaly. We observe one anomaly in the “Top 5/Any”
scenario for the SVM. Apparently, vectorization already causes a
drastic reduction of the attack performance. However, for ϵ ≥ 45,
going from vectorized to synthetic vectors increases the attack
performance. This is unexpected since the information lost in vec-
torization will not be restored by the synthesis process. Our current
hypothesis is that the SVM might overfit on the vectorized training
data, causing poor predictions on the vectorized test data, and the
randomness in the synthesis step in turn acts as regularization.
4.3.1 Comparison with Scrubbing Methods. We run the open
source scrubadub (http://scrubadub.readthedocs.org/) tool on the
20 newsgroups dataset to remove PII and evaluate the utility and
attack performance in our scenarios. Figure 5 shows a comparison
of the results with our SynTF method and optimal parameters.
The results indicate that our method outperforms the scrubbing
technique in preventing the attack in all four attack scenarios, at
a comparable level of utility. For instance, in the “Top 10/Any”
scenario listed in table 3, SynTF achieves an F1 score of 0.60 for
classification, where scrubadub is slightly better with 0.64, down
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(a) Multinomial naïve Bayes.
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(b) Linear SVM.
Figure 3: Relative performance of analyst (green) and attacker (red) tasks in different stages of the SynTF process, per attack
scenario (dotted: original data, dashed: tf vectors, solid: synthetic tf vectors). A (positive) gap between the green and red lines
shows howmuch the attack ismore affected than utility. Impact on attack increases with number of authors and active groups.
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Figure 4: Impact of letter bigram overlap factor s.
Table 3: Evaluation results (Top 10/Any)
Utility Attack Gain
Method F1 P R F1 P R ∆F1
none (original) 0.69 0.71 0.70 0.64 0.71 0.63 0.06
SynTF abs. 0.60 0.61 0.61 0.42 0.44 0.43 0.18
scrubadub abs. 0.64 0.65 0.65 0.57 0.63 0.57 0.06
SynTF rel. 87% 86% 87% 66% 61% 69% 20%
scrubadub rel. 92% 92% 92% 90% 88% 91% 02%
from 0.69. For the attack, however, scrubadub drops from 0.64 to
0.57, whereas SynTF manages to more than triple the reduction
and push the attacker’s performance down to 0.42.
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Figure 5: Comparing SynTF and traditional data removal.
5 RELATEDWORK
Authorship Obfuscation. Several countermeasures against au-
thorship attribution have been proposed. Rao and Rohatgi [35]
examine newsgroups postings and identify the authors from the
body of the text by analyzing the frequency of function words. They
suggest to either use automated machine translation to a foreign
language and back, or to educate authors who want to write anony-
mous documents about authorship attribution attacks. However,
these countermeasures are insufficient: In [7], Caliskan et al. show
that authorship attribution is still possible even after performing
multiple machine translations. Furthermore, Afroz et al. [3] show
that deceptive writing by an author trying to imitate another or to
obfuscate his own writing style can be detected with high accuracy.
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Anonymouth [26] is based on JStylo and uses clustering of two
references sets with the author’s and foreign sample texts to pro-
pose manual changes that have to be made to the document. The
process must be repeated until authorship attribution is prevented
sufficiently. Kacmarcik andGamon [19] follow a similar butmore au-
tomated approach based on decision trees and SVMs. Their method
adjusts the tf vector of a document by moving its feature values
closer to those of other writers, as to prevent the classifier from
identifying the correct author. While the countermeasure is effec-
tive against the evaluated SVMs with up to 70 features, the more
sophisticated unmasking approach by Koppel and Schler [21, 22] is
still able to distinguish the actual author from others. Kacmarcik
and Gamon in turn propose a “deep obfuscation” variant of their
method which iteratively tries to make unmasking harder, however,
this requires more and more changes to be made to the documents.
The results indicate that both methods are successful in prevent-
ing authorship attribution attacks in theory. However, the authors
of Anonymouth [26] observed that while users were able to imple-
ment the suggested changes for very small feature sets with only
9 features, they were overstrained with the changes for the more
complex “WritePrints (Limited)” feature set which we also used in
our experiments. Similarly, Kacmarcik and Gamon [19] observed
that for a deep level of obfuscation, one would have to consider
more and more features and make corresponding changes to the
document, thus increasing the complexity for the user. In practice,
both methods seem cumbersome for the user if a deep level of ob-
fuscation shall be reached. Furthermore, both methods only prevent
authorship attribution with respect to a specific reference corpus
with other authors. While our method does not produce human-
readable texts, it requires no manual changes to the documents,
and its protection is independent of a reference corpus.
De-Identification. De-identification (or scrubbing) methods pro-
vide a way to remove personally identifiable information (PII) from
textual documents. They are often motivated by the health care and
medical sectors and focus on identifying and removing particular
types of personal information such as protected health information
(PHI), a list of 18 identifiers as specified in the US Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) [43]. Popular methods
include the “Scrub System” [41], the “MITRE Identification Scrubber
Toolkit” (MIST) [2], or the PhysioNet “deid” software package [32].
They typically work with lists of names and identifiers, regular ex-
pressions, simple heuristics, and also machine learning techniques
to identify and remove pieces of text that constitute PII.
While this kind of information must be removed to protect the
privacy of the subjects mentioned in the document, our experiments
in section 4.3.1 show that de-identification based on scrubbing pro-
vides no adequate protection for the document’s author although
this is often critical, as in the case of complaint letters or patient
records to protect the privacy of the treating physician. Moreover,
we found that publications on these methods typically only evalu-
ate their methods’ ability to identify and remove all pieces of PII in
the text (cf. the survey by Uzuner et al. [44]). We have not seen any
evaluation on the impact of scrubbing on further processing with
text mining techniques such as document classification, and more
importantly, we have not found an evaluation whether and to what
extend these methods prevent authorship attribution techniques.
Differential Privacy. Differential privacy has been successfully
applied to a wide range of problems from simple statistical functions
to machine learning. The survey by Dwork [10] provides a good
overview of some earlier results. It is commonly used to provide
aggregate statistics, that is, multiple records are combined into
one result. A good example is RAPPOR [13], which allows the
collection of anonymized user statistics even over time. However,
releasing aggregate information only allows inferences on an entire
population, whereaswewant to classify each document individually.
Releasing individual data with an ϵ comparable to aggregating
mechanisms causes too much noise for individual records as it
masks any difference (topic, sentiment, etc.) between two inputs
and hence prevents any utility. The issue is well-known in the
literature and has been observed e.g. in the context of locations
[4, 25], graphs [37], and recommender systems [24]. Approaches
typically involve relaxing the privacy- or adjacency-definition [4,
8, 15]. Andrés et al. [4] circumvent the issue for location data by
generalizing differential privacy to metrics [8]. For graphs, Hay
et al. [14] define two varians of differential privacy, namely node
and edge privacy, where two graphs are considered adjacent if they
differ either in an entire node (including its edges) or in just a single
edge. According to Kasiviswanathan et al. [20], most works focus
on the strictly weaker edge privacy since it is harder to create node
private algorithms providing good utility with a comparable privacy
loss. For instance, Sala et al. [37] revert to edge privacy for sharing
graphs and obtain usable results with ϵ = 100 per edge (instead of
per node). In comparison, our SynTF mechanism achieves a privacy
loss of only 25.4 per word in the output (instead of per document).
6 CONCLUSION
Wehave presented SynTF, a novel approach to produce anonymized,
synthetic term frequency vectors which can be used in lieu of the
original term frequency vectors in typical applications based on the
vector space model. Our method produces sparse vectors which are
favorable regarding performance and memory efficiency. We have
proved that our method fulfills differential privacy which currently
serves as a “gold standard” for privacy definitions. Since our method
anonymizes each text individually, it can be used locally at the data
source to anonymize documents on-premise before collection, e.g.,
to obtain anonymized training data for machine learning or provide
personalized ads based on anonymized emails or search queries.
Although our method requires a large ϵ to get reasonable utility,
we provide evidence that this is necessary: First, we want to be
able to analyze records independently from each other, thus the
anonymization must not hide the influence of individual records in
the result. Second, we have derived a necessary condition on the
privacy parameter ϵ for the Exponential mechanism indicating that
it must grow logarithmically in the size of the output space when
high utility is required but only a limited number of “good” outputs
is available. To further address the issue, we have derived alternative
bounds on the privacy loss of the Exponential mechanism, which
in our case provide a substantial reduction of almost 50%.
We have performed an extensive evaluation of SynTF on the 20
newsgroups dataset and analyzed the influence of different param-
eters. Our results indicate that it effectively prevents authorship
attribution while facilitating tasks such as classification (utility). In
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contrast, our experiments show that traditional scrubbing methods
are insufficient at preventing authorship attribution attacks.
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